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U.S. regional data show that jobs created through the birth of
high-tech  firms  - though small-scale  - help  explain  why
growth rates differ between states. A high birthrate for firms is
negatively correlated with growth, but innovative activity at
technology's frontiers seems to raise the standard of living.
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The  major  longer-run  determinant  of  rising  living  standards,  in  industrial
and developing  countries  alike, is clearly the rate of  growth of  labor
productivity.  This,  in  turn,  is  strongly  influenced  by the  growth  of  technology
which many would  consider  "the  ultimate  constraint  on the rate of growth  of
national  income"  (Lewis,  1978,  p. 155).  Hence,  rapid  innovation  and/or  rapid
diffusion  and  adaptation  of technology  would  seem  to  be at least  necessary,  if
not  sufficient,  conditions  for  rapid  growth. It is  an open  question,  however,
whether  all  technologies  will  be equally  suitable  and  growth  promoting.  As the
"choice of  techniques"  literature  has  amply shown, the  adoption of  new
technology,  while very important,  need not be a short-cut  to rapid growth
acceleration  in  a developing  country.
For developed  countries,  however, the usual argument  has been that
innovation  is  crucial,  in  particular  if this  innovation  is at the frontier  of
technology.  In  other  words,  it is  not  just technological  progress  per  se,  but
the  rapid  expansion  of  what  have  been dubbcd  "high  technology"  activities  that
should  ensure  rapid  productivity  growth. In  part  this  would  be because  of the
high level  of productivity  in  high-tech  sectors  themselves. In  part it  could
stem  from  forms  of  export-led  growth,  since  it  could  be expected  that  the  income
elasticity  of demand  for the  products  of high-tech  on world  markets  would  be
above  average. In  addition,  the  introduction  of  high-tech  could  facilitate  the
achievement  of dynamic  scale  economies  and  might act as a magnet  pulling  in
resources  from  other  areas.
If all this is true,  then explanations  for inter-country  growth  rate
differences  should  include  some  variable  proxying  high-tech  activities.  However,
beyond  bland generalizations  about  the  successes  of Japan  or Silicon  Valley,
there  does  not seem  to  have been  much  serious  testing  of the growth-promoting
properties  of  high-technology.  Indeed,  the  same  casual  empiricism  could  lead  one
to very different  conclusions--after  all, it has often  been economies  at the
frontier  of technology  and  basic research  which  have grown  relatively  slowly-2-
(e.g.  Britain  or the  United  States),  and  imitator  countries  that  have  been  most
successful  (e.g.  Italy  or  South  Korea). It  is  true  that  a  recent  paper  has  shown
that  innovative  activity,  proxied  by patents  data,  did  contribute  to growth  in
a  cross-country  context (Fagerberg,  1987), but  there  is  no  necessary
correspondence  between  high technology  and  the  intensity  of patenting.
Possibly  the  major  problem  encountered  in trying  to test  any  proposition
about high-tech  has been data availability.  There is no internationally
standardized  definition  of what constitutes  a high-tech activity,  nor are
comparable  data  readily  available  for  a sufficiently  large  number  of countries
and/or time periods.  For the United States,  however, the Small Business
Administration  (SBA)  has recently  compiled  a comprehensive  database  covering
changes in employment  between 1976 and  1986, for  high technology,'  low
technology  and  "other"  technology  sectors.
Equally  important,  for  present  purposes,  the  data  are  available  on  a  state-
by-state  basis. The  existence  of  this  information  allows,  therefore,  some  simple
testing  of the relationship  between  growth  and the introduction  of advanced
technology.  If  the  latter  is  a  major  contributor  to  prosperity,  then  one  would
expect  that  regions  with above-average  employment  growth  in  high-tech  sectors
would  also record  above  average  growth  rates  of total  output,  and  vice versa.
Such  an  approach  may  thus  add  one  further  element  to  our  knowledge  of  "why  growth
rates  differ,"  even if the question  in this instance  would not be asked  for
countries  but  only  for  regions  within  a  country.  Section  II  briefly  outlines  the
simple  methodology  that  was followed  to  test  for  this  proposition,  Section  III
presents  the results  obtained,  while the Conclusions  briefly summarize  the
various  arguments.
II.  APPROACH
In principle,  the most appropriate  method for testing whether the
introduction  of  high-tech  activities  contributed  to  growth  would  appear  to  be  one
1 A  high  technology  industry is eefined  as one in which  "more  than  8 per cent  of the emnployees [are]  in
scientific, engineering, and technical occupations and at least 5 percent in  the more narrow c.lass  of scientific
and  engineering  occupatlons."  (Office of Technology Assessment,  1984. p.1
18).  To  the  .O  three-digit  SIC
industries fulfilling these criteria are added four more sectors that figure in a separate list of high-tech
industries classified  by the share  of direct  and  indirect R&D  spending in product sales  (ibid).  In 1976,
employment so defined represented 7.4 percent of the United States' private sector workforce.-3-
that  started  with  some  standard  explanation  of  why  regional  growth  rates  differ,
gleaned  from  theory  and  existing  empirical  work. To this  could  then  be added  a
proxy for high-tech  activities,  in order to see whether the conventional
explanation  could  be strengthened.
Unfortunately,  no such standard  or conventional  explanation  is easily
forthcoming.  There  are,  instead,  numerous,  and  often  conflicting,  approaches  to
why growth  rates  may differ  across  countries  or regions.  Some  of the  better
known  explanations  are:
i)  The  role  of differential  growth  in factor  supplies,  in liiLe  with  the
neo-classical  approach;
ii)  The importance  of a dynamic  export  sector  able to  promote  a process
of export-led  growth;
iii)  The  strength  of "leading"  or "lagging"  sectors  (such  as  manufacturing
or  government),  following  the  old  Physiocratic  thesis  that  some  parcs
of  the  economy  are  more important  than  other;
iv)  The  retarding  influence  of "institutional  sclerosis";
v)  The degree  of relative  maturity  or backwardness,  on the  hypothesis
that  a low  starting  point  allows  catching  up possibilities.
While  in  theory  any  of  these  approaches  could  be  used,  in  practice  several
of them  may not be feasible. For  one thing,  the time  period  imposed  by the
existing  database  (1976-86)  is relatively  short--a  full  explanation  of inter-
state  growth  rate  differences  would  ideally  require  data  stretching  over  two  or
three  decades.  Moreover,  testing  a  proper  specification  of  these  various  models
might  not be possible  because  of the unavailability  of many of the required
statistical  series. Finally,  not  all  the  approaches  may  be  equally  appropriate
for  an  explanation  of regional  growth  rate  differences  within  a single  country.
A straightforward  application  of  neo-classical  theory  could  either  use  a
growth-accounting  methodology  (Denison,  1967)  or  estimate  an  aggregate  production
function. The  absence  of state-by-state  capital  stock  data,  however,  prevents
this.  In any case, such an approach  would only provide a very proximate
explanation. Neither  capital  nor labor  are rully  independent  of the growth
process itself,  and particularly  so in a reg  onal context in which factor-4-
mobility is very high.  Grcwth of factor inputs, in other words, could be a
function of output  growth  as demand  created  its own  supply by  drawiuig  in
resources from other states.
Data unavailability also prevents the testing of the export-led growth
hypothesis (Beckerman,  1962).  This is  disappointing  because of the crucial role
exports are bound to play in a state context.  Regions are usually a good deal
more open than countries and for many firr..s  ".  . . local demand is likely to be
trivial compared with the optimum production capacity; . . . the viability of
regional  enterprises must largely  depend on the strength  of demand from  outside
the  region"  (Dixon  and  Thirwall,  1975,  p.207). 2 On  t'  )ther hand,  an
explanation  that  privileged exports  would  also only  be proximate.  Since initial
exchange rate undervaluation could not be invoked as a reason for successful
export  performance, the latter  would have to be explained by reference to those
underlying factors that make a state attractive to "footloose" industry (e.g.,
provision of public services, tax incidence,  wage le'els, sunshine, etc.).
A  very  similar conclusion  would  probably  emerge  if  one  adopted  the
hypothesis that  manufacturing was "the engine  of growth" (Kaldor,  1966).  Since
most tradables are manufactures, this thesis would mesh with the export-led
approach 3 and be similarly unrevealing about the final cause of growth rate
differer:ces. As  for the role of the public sector (Bacon and Eltis, 1974),
causation is ambiguous, particularly so in a regional context.  Financial or
physical crowdiag-out are highly unlikely.  Indeed, crowding-in would be more
plausible since  high levels  of state  expenditure  could  encourage the immigration
of both people and firms.  On the other hand, a relatively large public sector
might reflect a relatively high level of local taxation that would, in turn,
discourage growth  by diminishing the state's attractiveness to business.  Both
positive and negative effects can be found in the literature (Helms,  1985; Ram,
1986).
2 This  judgement,  made  for  the relatively  small  regions  of the  United  Klngdom,  may sound  extreme  for  some  of
the  much  iarger  states  that  exist  within  the  United  States. Yet  even in  the  latter  context,  external  demand
is  likely  to  be  of  paramount  importance.
3  Manufacturing,  in  addition,  could  also  promote  growth  through  import-substitution.-5-
The "institutional  sclerosis"  thesis (Olson,  1982) links growth  rate
differences  to  the  hypothesis  that  as  countries  or  regions  get  older,  established
interests  (such  as  professional  associations,  cartels,  unions),  strengthen  their
power  at the expense  of society  as whole.  In contrast  to many of the other
hypotheses,  this  one  has  been  subject  to  some  empirical  testing,  but  the  results
obtainLed  would  seem  inconclusive.  One  study  finds  support  for  the  thesis  that
the 'older"  the  state,  the lower  its  growth  rate (Vedder  and  Gallaway,  1986).
Another,  however,  looking  at  a  somewhat  longer  time-period,  obtains  results  that
fail  to support  the  hypothesis  (Wallis  and  Oates,  1988).
Much  less  inconclusive  are  the  results  obtained  at  the  international  level
for  a  somewhat  different  formulation  of  the  "maturity"  hypothesis--the  idea  that
countries  at  lower  levels  of  development  (and,  hence,  living  standards)  can  grow
rapidly  by catching  up with  more advanced  countries  (Baumol,  1986;  Fagerberg,
1987). Unless  one  believes  that  "cumulative  causation"  is at  work (i.e.,  that
richer  regions  attract  a country's  best resources),  the effect  of relative
backwardness  can be expected  to be even stronger  in a national  than in an
international  context,  thanks  to the  higher  degree  c  Cactor  mobility  present
within  countries.  Less  developed  regions  should  benefit  not  only  from  catch-up
possibilities,  but also from an inflow  of industry  attracted  by lower  wage
levels.  This thesis  has received  recent  confirmation  for the United  States
(Barro  and  Sala i  Martin,  1989).
The  foregoing  suggests  that  any  approach  to  the  question  of  why state-by-
state  growth  rates  differ  within  the  United  States  is  bound  to  be eclectic. An
obvious  first  step  would  be to  consider  initial  income  levels. The  lower  these
are,  the  greater  the  potential  may  be  for  future  growth. A  second  set  of  factors
should  look at the attempts  made to exploit this potential,  such as, for
instance,  investment  through  the period. 4 Third, some variables  should  be
introduced  to measure  a state's  attractiveness  to  mobile  industry  (e.g.,  wage
levels,  tax  rates,  degree  of  work force  unionization,  etc).  Fourth,  it  would
4 State-by-state  investment data are only available for the manufacturing sector; the absence of full data,
however,  should  not  matter  much  given  the sector's  importance  in any explanation  of  regional growth  rate
differences.  More unfortunate  La the unavailabiltLy cf any data beyond 1982.-6-
also seem necessary to account for labor supply,  e.g., by looking at changes in
population growth or in  participation rates (even  though such variables are  not
completely independent from income growth).  And finally the role of innovative
activity as proxied by the growth of employment in high-tech sectors should  be
examined  .'
III. RESULTS
In line with  the considerations outlined above,  a basic equation was
estimated whose dependent variable was the growth of per capita income (Gross
State Product, or GSP) in each of the 48 contiguous suates over the 1976-86
decade. 6 The choice of the two terminal years, imposed by data availability,
should  not  bias  the  results  unduly.  For  one  thing,  monetary  and  other
macroeconomic  conditions  tend  to  be  broadly similar  throughout  the  country  at  any
given period of time,  which is a good reason for using this type of sample for
studying the contribution of microeconomic factors (such as "high tech") to
growth.  For another, the overall state of the economy differed little between
the two years.  Thus, pressures on capacity were roughly similar (the rates of
U.S. unemployment were 7.7 and 7.0 percent respectively), the real price of oil
was virtually identical, and though the real value of the dollar was higher in
1986 than a decade earlier, the difference was less than 4 percent.  The one
major difference between the two years was in real interest rates, which were
some three  times  higher in  1986 than  in 1976,  but it  is  unlikely that this  factor
should have influenced some states  more than others.
In the  basic equation (i.e.,  before introducing  micro-d.ta on technology)
income growth was related to per capita income at the beginning of the period,
changes in  the investment/GSP  ratio,  changes in  labor force  participation rates,
a number of variables standing for state attractiveness, and changes in the
5  Special events  or exogenous shocks can also influence states' fortunes over time.  In the decade 1976-86,
agricultural and mining output were affected by sharp price fluctuations, particularly marked  in the case of
oil.  Hence, allowance may have to be made for the impact of such changes by, for instance, introducing changes
in the share of output in these sectors into any estimated equation.
6 Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia were dropped from the sample due to the inherent differences
between these areas and the rest of the country.-7-
sliares  of  agricultural  and  mining  output  to  allow  for  any  special  e-  fects  arising
from  sharp  price  fluctuations  in  these  two  sectors  through  the  period. The  first
two  columns  of  Table  1  present  selected  regression  results.
As  expected,  the  coefficient  on  state  incomsi  at  the  beginning  of  the  period
is  negative  and  highly  significant.  Positive  and  also  significant  is  the  change
in  the  investment  share  between  1977  and  1982  (unavailability  of state-by-state
investment  figures  after  1982  imposed  the  choice  of such  a short  time-span).'
Together,  theses  two  forces  confirm  that  regional  growth  is  strongly  related  to
"the  potential  for imitation  [and]  the efforts  mobilized  for  exploiting  this
potential"  (Fagerberg,  1987,  p.93). A further  positive  influence  is  exercised
by  changes in the participation  rate  (defined  as employment  over total
population),  though  the  statistical  significance  of this  variable  is  lower.
Less  successful  were  attempts  to  account  for  state  attractiveness  (beyond
what is already picked up  through the use of  1976 per  capita output).
Coefficients  on initial  tax  levels,  for  instance,  while  usually  negative,  were
seldom  statistically  significant.  Similarly  negative,  and  thus  in line  with a
priori  expectations,  was the influence  of the initial  wage level,  but this
variable  was,  predictably  perhaps,  less  significant  than  initial  GSP  per  capita.
The rate of labor  force  unionization  at the  beginning  of the  period  was not
statistically  significant.  Nor was  a  variable standing for both  state
attractiveness  and labor inputs:  .ne  growth  of population  in the  preceding
decade  (1966-76).
Nearly  equally  inconclusive  were  tests  for  the  importance  of  agricultural
or mining output.  Despite sharp price swings throughout  the decade, no
perceptible  effects  could  be found  from  changes  in  the  share  of farm  output  in
GSP,  and  only  a very  small  non-significant  positive  effect  from  changes  in the
share  of  mining  production  (as  shown  in column  2 of  Table  1).8
7 ICORs were also tested, but not found to be significant.
8 The effect becomes significant, however, in equation (4) once allowance is made for 'high-tech" variables.-8-
Table 1.  Selected Regression Results
"Base"  eguations  High-tech"  eguations
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dependent  variable:  DLYP
Intercept  0.90  0.87  0.89  0.81
(4.9)  (4.6)  (6.0)  (6.1)
LYP 78 -0.33f  -0.28  -0.27  -0.24
(4.0)  (3.8)  (4.1)  (4.0)
DLKS  0.14  0.15  0.07  0.08
(3.6)  (3.8)  (2.0)  (2.7)
DLEMP  0.23  0.25  0.35  0.42
(1.7)  (1.9)  (2.6)  (3.5)
DLMIN  0.02  0.06
(1.0)  (3.4)
SBH  0.99  1.27
(3.5)  (4.8)
BNM  -0.25  -0.28
(2.7)  (3.5)
Adj. R-square  0.51  0.51  0.68  0.74
F-statistics  17.1  13.101  20.7  23.1
Notes:  Estimated  for  the  48 contiguous  states  of the  United  States;
figures  in  brackets  are  t-ratios.
D  - percentage  change  over  1976-86  period;
L  - natural logarithi;
YP  - GSP  per  capita  in  constant  prices;
YP76  =  GS?  per  capita  in  1976;
KS  - share  of manufacturing  investment  in GSP, at current
prices,  1977-82;
EMP  =  total  employment  in  percent  of  population;
MIN  - share  of  mining  production  in GSP, at current  prices,
1976-86;
SBH  =  Share in Births of High-tech,  defined as employment
creation  in high-tech  new firms from 1976 to 1986,
divided  by employment  creation  in  all  new  firms;
BNN  - Births Normalized by  Mean  employment,  defined as
cumulative  1976-86  employment  change  in  all  new  firms,
measured  at  two-yearly  intervals,  normalized  by average
state  employment  during  the  decade.-9-
The equations  reported  are imperfect;  they  were,  however,  obtained  from
data  spanning  a short  period  of time. Had  it  been  possible  to investigate  the
reasons  for inter-state  growth  differences  over several  decades,  the results
would almost  certainly  have been greatly  impro'ired.  Nevertheless,  they ere
clearly  significant.  State  income,  in  particular,  has  both  the  expected  negative
sign,  as well  as a robust  t-statistic.
Having  obtained  a 'base"  equation,  the  next  step  was to  determine  whether
high technology  activities  played an important  supplementary  role in the
explanation  of  growth  rate  differences.  To do  this,  a  number  of  variables  were
tried  using  the 1976-86  Small  Business  Administration  (SBA)  database. 9 This
source  provides  information,  at two-yearly  intervals,  on total employment,
employment  in new firms,'°  employment  in firms that ceased  operations,  and
employment  in existing  firms  that either  expanded  or contracted. In each of
these  catogories,  the  data  are  subdivided  into  three  categories:  high-tech;  low-
tech;  and  other  tech.
The  best  results  obtained  are  shown  in  columns  3  end  4  of  Table  1. The  new
variables,  introduced  in these  equations,  are  defined  as follows: SBH is the
share  of births  in  high-tech,  defined  as employment  creation  in  high-tech  new
firms,  from  1976  to 1986,  divided  by employment  creation  in  all  new  firms. BNM
is births normalized  by Mean employment,  that is, the cumulative  1976-86
employment  change  in  all  new  firms,  measured  at  two-yearly  intervals,  normalized
by average  state  employment  during  the  decade. It is clear  that  the share  of
high-tech  employment  in  the  total  growth  of  employment  due  to  new  births  of  firms
strongly  improves  the  fit  of the  equation. Innovative  activity  at the  frontier
is an important  contributor  to the  growth  of incomes  per capita  (even  though
high-tech  employment  accounts  on  average  for  less  than  10  percent  of the  total
workforce).
9  Data  are  frorn  the  U.S.  Establishme:.:  a.Ld  Enterprise  Microdata  (USEEM)  files  developed  by  The  Brookings
Instltution  for  the  Small  Business  Administration.  For  further  information,  see  Office  of  Tech'clvusy
Assessment,  1984.
10 In  this  paper,  'firms" refers  to  an  enterprise  cr  group  of  enterprLses.  For  example,  McDonald's  would  be
a  firm,  while each  individual  McDonald's  restaurant  would  be  referred  to  as  an  'establishment."-10-
Interestingly,  an overall  high average  birth  rate  of new firms  over  the
period,  BNM,  has a strong  negative  impact  on productivity  growth. This is a
robust  result  which  is  likely  to  reflect  two  separate  forces. First,  many  new
firms  (though  clearly  not  high-tech  ones)  may  not  b. very  productive  in their
early stages of operation  and may need time to mature and achieve scale
economies.  Second,  the  widespread  creation  of  new  firms  (of  which  many  may  not
last  long)  could  w%-ell  be  concentrated  in  low  productivity  service  sectors.  This
would  depress  rather  than  boost  overall  per  capita  growth.
Since  the  "birthing"  process  itself  is  adverse  to  growth,  the  contribution
of "high-tech"  can  only  be  well  measured  if  this  factor  is  distinguished  clearly
from  births  in  general. By  normalizing  high-tech  employment  creation  by total
employment  created  through  births,  the  SBH  variable  succeeds  in  distinguishing
the  contribution  of  high-tech.
The  introduction  of  these two new variables clearly improves the
statistical  properties  of the "base"  equations.  Not only are the summary
measures  of  goodness  of fit  higher,  but  the  statistical  significance  of several
coefficients  is  also  raised. From  these  results,  a  prima  facie  case  can  be  made
for  the  importance  of  high-technology  activities  in  influencing  the  growth  rate
of an  economy. It  should  not  be forgotten,  however,  that  causation  could  still
be ambiguous. While  the  rapid  growth  of  high-tech  activities  could  well  be a
crucial  determinant  of overall  growth,  the  latter  may, at the same  time,  be a
force  attracting  production  of high-tech  goods and services.  Some mutual
causation,  in  other  words,  cannot  be ruled  out.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
This note studies  the influence  of "high  technology"  on the growth  of
output  by using  cross-section  data  on  U.S.  States. An eclectic  approach  to  the
"sources-of-growth"  literature  leads  to  the  estimate  of a  "base"  equation  which
explains  about  half  of the  differences  in  per  capita  GSP  growth  rates  of the  48
contiguous  States  in the decade  1976-86.  Through  the use of micro-data  on-11-
employment  in  high-tech  activities,  tests  are  then  conducted  to  see  whether  the
importance  of high-tech,  as measured  by employment  creation  in new firms,
enhances  the  explanation  of growth  differences.
The results  obtained  confirm  first,  the importance  of starting  income
levels and of changes in the investment  share in output, as well as of
participation  rate  changes,  in  influencing  regional  growth  rates. In addition,
it  appears  that  a  high  overall  birth  rate  of  firms,  on  average  during  the  period,
is negatively  related  to growth  during  that period.  However,  the share of
employment  created  in  new  firms  that  occurs  in  high-tech  activities  does  have  e
powerful  and positive  influence  on per capita  income  growth.  This provides
support  for  the  hypothesis  that  innovative  activity  at  the  frontier  of  technology
contributes  to rising  living  standards.-12-
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